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study reported in this paper.TRAFFIC BEYOND PRECEDENT, CARRIED WITH ECONOMY
During the business expansion that began in 1938—an expansion
influenced greatly by the necessities of war, although it was under
way before the outbreak in September 1939—the railroads of the
United States have handled an unprecedented cyclical growth of
traffic without a proportionate increase in their use of economic re-
sources.
The monthly movement of freight has grown from 23 to 62 billion
ton-miles. At the low point in 1938 people traveled 1.70 billion pas-
senger-miles per month; recently about 7.94 billion.Absolutely or
percentagewise, in freight or in passenger-traffic, the increase during
the current expansion to date has been greater than in the first World
War or in any of the five subsequent peace-time expansions (Table
1). Totals are at higher levels than ever before. The most recent
TABLE 1
Ton-miles and Passenger-miles, Seasonally Adjusted
Increase from Trough to Peak
DATE OF AMOUNT DATE OF AMOUNT INCREASE
TROUGH AT TROUGH PEAK AT PEAK
Billionsa Billionsa Billions
A TON-MILES
Dec. 1914 21.9 Apr.1918 35.8 13.9 63
Mar. 1919 31.1 Feb.1920 39.5 8.4 27
July 1921 24.6 Apr. 1923 37.1 12.5 51
June 1924 30.8 July1926 37.9 7.1 23
Dec. 1927 34.1 Aug. 1929 37.8 3.7 11
July 1932 17.1 Apr. 1937 33.1 16.0 94
May 1938 22.9 July1943C 62.5 39.6 173
B PASSENGER-MILES
Dec. 1914 2.58 May 1918 3.82 1.24 48
Oct. 1918 3.50 Aug. 1920 4.04 0.54 15
Feb. 1922 2.83 Oct.1923 3.26 0.43 15
Apr. 1925 2.89 Aug. 1925 3.06 0.17 6
Dec. 1928 2.55b Mar. 1929 2.71b 0.16 6
Mar. 1933 1.16 Mar. 1937 2.10 0.91 76
Aug. 1938 1.70 July1943C 7.94 6.24 367
aAveragefor trough (or peak) month and preceding and following month, except as
noted. 1914-18: revenue ton-miles as estimated by Babson statistical organization from
1914 revenue data, and from 1918 revenue and non-revenue ton miles. 1919-20: revenue
and non-revenue ton-miles as reported by the I.C.C. All other expansions: revenue ton-
miles as reported by I.C.C. Passnger-miles 1914-18 estimated from monthly passenger
revenue and information on fares. Other figures from I.C.C. reports.
b Figure for turning month only. Expansion was so brief and small that averaging would
wipe out most of it.
CLatestdate for which 3-month average available. Peak not yet determinable.three-month average for ton-miles exceeds the highest similarly com-
puted peak (37.9 billion in 1926) by 65 per cent. Travel is substan-
tially above the previous all-time record, 4.04 billion passenger-miles
in 1920.1
From their respective low points in the second and third quarters
of 1938, revenue ton-miles have increased 173 per cent and passenger-
miles 367 per cent. In comparison the growth in plant and equipment
has been very small, the increase in employment and fuel consump-
tion only moderate.
On December 31, 1937 the book value of the investment of Class I
railways in plant and equipment was. $25,164,000,000.2 Between that
date and December 31, 1942, the companies made gross capital ex-
penditures of or only 7.9 per cent of the investment
at the beginning. The net addition after allowance for depreciation
and retirements would be even less.
There are only 6.4 per cent more freight cars and 5.7 per cent more
switching locomotives on the railroads than at the trough in '1938;
there are fewer freight and passenger locomotives, rail motor cars
and passenger cars (Table 2).
1 All data cited in this report refer to Class I line-haul railways and have been derived
from serial publications of the Interstate Commerce Commission, except at noted.
2 I.C.C.: Statistics of Railways, 1937,p.s-106. Includes investment in properties leased
to Class I roads. Revaluation on various bases might reduce the figure somewhat and
therefore increase the ratio of new investment since, but not materially in comparison
with the growth of traffic.
3Totalledfrom annual data in Julius 1-1. Parmelee: A Review of Railway Operations in
1942(publishedby Association of American Railroads, Bureau of Railway Economics),
p. 38.
TABLE 2
Number and Condition of Equipment on Line at Close of Month
%SERVICEABLE
TOTAL SERVICEABLE IS OF TOTAL
Month of Month of Month of
trQugh in August trough in August% trough in August
KIND OF EQUIPMENTtraffic" 1943change traffic" 1943change traffics1943
Freight locomotives 23,97822,031—8.1 16,80919,35415.1 70.1 87.8
Freight cars (thous.)1,928 2,052 6.4 1,698 2,00017.8 88.1 97.5
Yard locomotives 12,83213,569 5.7 10,40412,53720.5 81.192.4
Passenger locomotives7,920 6,738—14.9 5,995 5,896—1.7 75.7 87.5
Rail motor cars 3,053 2,782—8.9 2,778 2,570—7.5 91.092.4
Passenger-train carsb36,62235,229—3.8 33,41833,814 1.2 91.396.0
a May 1938 for first three and August 1938 for last three items. Yard locomotives are
used mostly to switch freight, and rail motor cars to move passengers.
b Does not include cars of Pullman Co.
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1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
wasnot in usable condition. Partly by retiring old and buying new
rolling stock, partly by repairs, the railroad companies have increased
the percentage of all equipment that is serviceable (Chart. 1). For
example, the ratio of serviceable to total freight locomotives, rose
from 70 to 88 per cent. The aggregate supply of serviceable freight
and yard equipment has been augmented; and serviceable passenger
equipment has not been reduced as much as the total. But the maxi-
[3J
Percentage
100mum increase in serviceable equipment of any kind has been only
20 per cent.
In other expansions for which there are monthly data, beginning
with 1921-23, the supply of equipment has commonly declined for
some months after traffic began to grow, and at times has declined
even throughout an expansion in traffic. In the present instance the
serviceable and the total supply of every kind of equipment declined
for a year or more after the trough in the kind of traffic it is. used to
handle (Table 3).
TABLE 3




KIND OF EQUIPMENT WAS LOWEST
Freight locomotives June 1941 July1939
Freight locomotivesb June 1941 Aug. 1939
Freight cars July 1940 July1939
Freight carsb Aug. 1940 Aug. 1939
Yard locomotives Aug. 1940 July1939
Passenger locomotives Nov. 1942c Oct.1940
Rail motor cars June 1943C Sept. 1942C
Passenger-train cars Sept. 1941 Mar. 1941
a End of month, not seasonally adjusted, except as noted.
b Number at beginning and end of month averaged, then seasonally adjusted.
CTentative.
The railroads have increased the number of workers in their labor
force by only 50 per cent since the trough in freight traffic (Table 4).
A longer work week has been a factor in this conservative use of
manpower. Data on working time are available only for employees
TABLE 4
Railway Labor Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted
Averages for three months ending





All employees: number (tFious,) 903 1,359 50
All employees for whom hours
worked are reported:
Number (thous.) 830 1,265 52
Totalhours worked (mill.) 159.9 283.4 77
Hours worked per employee 192.6 224.2 16
[4)CHART 2
Freight Service Operating Averages, Seasonally Adjusfed
January 1938-Augus$ 1943
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forwhom statistics are reported on an hourly basis, but
included 89 per cent of all workers at the beginning of the
The number of persons in it has increased 52percent, or
























Passenger Service Operating Averages, Seasonally Adjusted
January 1938-August 1943
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hoursthey worked (including overtime) increased 77percent. Time
worked per employee increased about 16 per cent. But even the in-
crease in aggregate hours worked has been far from proportionate to
the growth of traffic.
[6)









































2.5The only commodity for which there are current statistics of con-
sumption by is fuel. The amount of coal or its equivalent
consumed by freight locomotives has not risen in proportion to ton-
miles, nor the consumption by passenger locomotives in proportion
to passenger-miles. In other words, the productivity of fuel has risen
with expansion of traffic (Charts 2, 3).4
That output should grow faster than. input accords with previous
experience. In earlier cyclical expansions also, traffic increased more
rapidly than investment, employment, or consumption of fuel; and
it tended to decline more rapidly in contractions. But the present
expansion provides the most striking example on record of the
general relationship.
GROWTH AND COMPOSITION OF TRAFFIC
Not only the general expansion of defense and war activity but
individual chapters in the his.tory of the war seem to have their
analogues in the curve of freight traffic (Chart 4). It rose sharply
from May to October 1939, suggesting that a preliminary flurry of
foreign orders for goods in anticipation of the outbreak of hostilities
may have occurred. During the relatively quiescent warfare in' the
winter of 1939-40 the curve remains fiat. The revelatory events in the
summer of 1940 no doubt accelerated the British war effort and the
placement of orders here. The United States government also in-
creased its defensive measures. After the spring of 1941 the lease-
lend policy added to the flow of goods. Eventually, of course, the
entry of the United States provided an additional stimulus to the
production and shipment of war commodities. In general, freight
traffic has increased much more rapidly since about October 1940
than before.
Entry of the United States brought one special but very important
consequence for the railroads. In ordinary times the petroleum
refineries along the East Coast are supplied with crude oil from the
Gulf Coast by tank vessels. A large amount of refined products is
brought to the East by the same route. In the autumn of 1941 diver-
sion of tankers to trans-oceanic service had threatened to interfere
with this movement, and some oil for the East was diverted to the
railroads. The weekly rail traffic reached an average of 141,000 bar-
rels per day in October, but then declined rapidly. After the United
States became a belligerent in December, however, a submarine cam-
Otherfuels and electricity are included in the ligures at their coal equivalent as esti-










Revenue Ton—miles, January 1938 —August 1943
paign made coastwise shipments extremely hazardous; furthermore,
the diversion of tankers to other uses was accelerated. After a few
weeks of hesitation the rail movement into the East began to increase
rapidly, reaching a level of over barrels per day during part
of the following summer. This traffic accounts for a large portion of
the sharp extra-seasonal rise early in
Thedisturbance of the normal currents in the flow of oil may be
illustrated by comparing rail traffic in the third quarter of 1941 and
800,000 barrels per day is 24,000,000 per mouth, or, at a weight of about 0.15 ton
per barrel, 3,600,000 tons. The average length of haul by rail may well have been at
least 1,000 miles, and the total ton-miles therefore at least 3.6 billion. Traffic of all
kinds in April 1942 and in each of the following four m,onths exceeded that in Novem-
ber by about 15 billion ton-miles.
[8)
1938 1939 1940 1942 1943in the third quarter of 1942 (Table 5). Ordinarily the railroads carry
little crude; it moves by pipeline or pipe and tanker to the refineries.
Between the two quarters tonnage of crude oil originated by the
railroads more than tripled as eastern refineries found their ordinary
supply routes cut off and turned to overland shipment. Under
ordinary conditions the tonnage of refined products terminating in
the southwestern producing areas is about half the amount origin-
ating there; after rail termination most of this goes on by tanker to
the East, although some may be consumed locally. In 1942, however,
the tonnage terminating in the Southwest fell to 14 per cent of that
originated in the case of gasoline, kerosene, etc., and 5 per cent in
the case of fuel and other residual oil. Usually the tonnage of refined
products terminating in the East is about the same as the tonnage
originating there, indicating that it consists mostly of traffic sent out
from the local coast refineries. But in 1942 tonnage of light products
originating in this area was only 22 per cent, and of heavy products
6 per cent of tonnage terminating there. The rest of the supply
delivered by rail came overland from outside refineries.
TABLE 5
PetroleumTraffic Originated and Terminated by Railroa'ds
Third Quarter, 1941 and 1942
GASOLINE & FUEL OIL &
CRUDE OTHER LIGHT OTHER HEAVY
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS PRODUCTS
1941 1942 1941 1942 1941 1942
4Southwestern Statesa
Orig. (thous. tons) 3763,705 3,1624,119 6822,349
Term. (thous.tons) 652 227 1,515 576 339 127
%term. is of orig. 173 6 48 14 50 5
18 Eastern Statesb
Orig. (thous. tons) 4 15 2,175 754 976 207
Term.(thous. tons) 2804,674 2,0893,382 9883,425
% orig. is of term. 1 C 104 22 99 6
United States
Orig. (thous. tons) 2,0566,542 9,8307,236 3,2344,724
% of 1941 100 318 100 74 100 146
aTexas,Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Kansas, the principal southwestern producers.
b New England and New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Wash-
ington, D. C,, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida.
CLessthan 0.5 per Cent.
The submarine campaign interfered with the coastwise rrlovement
of coal also. Ordinarily coal from the southern ApFalachian fields
destined for New England moves b.y rail to the ports at Hampton
r9)Roads, Virginia, and is carried thence by ocean. Between the third
quarter of 1941andthe third quarter of 1942, the tonnage of coal
terminated in Virginia by the railroads fell 45 per cent. At the same
time the overland all-rail movement from the southern fields to
northern destinations rose. In this case, unlike that of petroleum, the
elimination of water movement presumably did not appreciably affect
the total rail tonnage originated, but it did lengthen the average
rail haul and add to ton-miles.
War in the Far East has enhanced the importance of traffic moving
to the three Pacific Coast states. In the first quarter of 1941 tonnage
terminated there was 4.46 per cent of all tonnage terminated, in the
first quarter of 1942, 5.69 per cent, and in the first quarter of 1943,
6.20 per cent. From the 1941 to the 1943 quarter, all tonnage termin-
ated increased 32 per cent; tonnage terminated in California, Oregon
and Washington 83 per cent. Much of this traffic must move across a
large portion of the continent. The increase in westbound ton-
mileage may therefore differ even more strikingly from the general
increase in ton-miles. Directional data on ton-miles are not available,
but figures for car-miles on the Union Pacific are suggestive: in the
three months ending August 31, 1943 westbound loaded car-miles
were 215 per cent greater than in the corresponding period of 1938;
the increase in eastbound movement was only 64 per cent.
In the course of an expansion, traffic composed of durable goods
usually increases faster than other traffic; the ratio of durable ton-
nage to total tonnage originated rises. Until recently at least, it did so
in the present expansion. Of the originated tonnage 25.39 per cent
was durable goods in 1938, 29.42 per cent in 1939, 31.42 per cent
in 1940, 34.48 per cent in 1941. It is hard to say what happened
in 1942 (and complete 1943 figures are not yet available). For
military reasons the tonnage of metallic ores. (except iron) and the
metals produced from them, all of which we have classified in pre-
vious years as durables traffic, is no longer shown separately in the
basic statistics, although it is still included in total tonnage. In com-
puting the ratio for 1942 we are therefore obliged to regard these
articles as other than durable. When the 1941 ratio is recomputed on
the same basis, it shows a drop from 33.77 per cent in 1941 to 33.46
per cent in 1942. In 1941 the tonnage of the secret commodities was
only 0.71 per cent of the total freight tonnage. But this kind of traffic
may have increased rapidly. In view of the smallness of the drop in
the percentage of durable to total, computed with these items omitted
[10)from the durables group, it would quite possibly show a rise if they
could be included. But apparently the rise would not be as rapid as in
preceding years.
Ordinarily there is some tendency for the average distance over
which a ton of freight moves to shorten during an expansion of
traffic. In the first three and a half years of the present expansion
there was little net change. In 1942, however, largely because of the
overland oil movement and the westbound transcontinental traffic,
the average haul lengthened rapidly. The seasonally adjusted figure
is 393 miles for the second quarter of 1938, 389 for the fourth
quarter of 1941, and 471 for the first quarter of 1943.
0
CHART 5
From 1938 to 1940 passenger traffic rose only slightly (Chart
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5).
themovement to camp of men drafted under the SelectIve Service Act
passed in September. The number of officers arid men in the regular
army increased by 37,900 in December, 111,800 in January, 168,200
in February, 207,000 in. March, and at an irregularly declining rate
thereafter until September.° 207,000 members of the armed forces on
duty traveled on trains in January, 232,800 in February and 327,200
in March; the number declined irregularly thereafter.7 Movement of
the armed forces, on military account and on furlough, accounts for
most of the enormously rapid growth in passenger traffic since late
1941. Doubtless there has also been a large increase in civilian travel
connected with the war. Gasoline rationing and other measures
restricting automobile transport must have diverted civilian travel to
the railroads during part of the period.
CARLOADS AND TRMNLOADS
During an expansion of traffic the average number of tons or passen-
gers carried in a car or a train usually increases. The change in load
contributes to the economy in the use of equipment and other
resources.
In the present instance the number of ton-miles per loaded car-mile
has risen from 25.7 at the 1938 trough to 33.1 at the most recent
date for which information is available, or 29 per cent (Table 8).
In large part the rise in the average load is a result of changes
in the composition of traffic. Some commodities shipped in carload
lots are loaded to higher average weights per car than others. Ship-
ments of the more heavily loaded commodities fall off more rapidly
in contraction and multiply more rapidly in expansion than those of
the more lightly loaded articles. Carload traffic as a whole increases
faster than less-than-carload traffic, which is. very lightly loaded. If
the 1942 average loads for individual commodities had prevailed in
1938, in conjunction with the 1938 traffic composition, the average
load for all carload traffic would have been 38.40 tons. The same
average loads, in conjunction with the 1942 composition, resulted in.
an average of 40.14 tons for all carload traffic in 1942. Carload ton-
nage as a whole was 85 per cent higher in 1942 than in 1938; l.c.l.
tonnage, only 22 per cent higher.
The changes in the composition of traffic, however, were not the
only reason for the improvement in loading. Average loads for most
6Computedfrom data in the Annual Reporl,1941, ofthe Secretary of War, facing
p. 104.
Association of American Railroads, Car Service Division, Annual Report, 1941.
[12)individual commodities were heavier in 1942 than in 1938. The
1938 composition, in association with the 1938 individual loads, re-
sulted in an average for all carload traffic of 35.78 tons. As just
noted, the same composition, if it had been associated with the 1942
individual loads, would have produced an average of 38.40 tons.
Two orders of the Office of Defense Transportation. have con-
tributed to the general improvement in loading. Effective May 1,
1942 the railroads were directed to place at least 6 tons in each car
used for less than carload freight. On July 1 the minimum rose to 8,
and on September 1 to :to tons. (Exceptions were allowed under cer-
tain circumstances)Quarterlyfigures on the number of l.c.l. tons
originated (published by the I.C.C.) and on the number of mer-
chandise (l.c.l.) cars loaded (published by the Association of Amer-
ican Railroads) give some indication of what has been accomplished
in this respect. A large amount of l.c.1. freight is transferred from
one car to another in transit, some of it more than once. The A.A.R.
figures pertain to all l.c.l. cars including those loaded in whole or .in
part with freight that started its journey in other cars. Tons loaded
therefore exceed tons originated and the ratio of tons originated to
cars loaded understates the average amount of merchandise placed in
a car at its initial loading point. Nevertheless the trend in the ratio
is illuminating. It rose considerably in 1941, indicating that the
railroads were making some progress in this. respect before the order
(Table 6). But much sharper rises occurred in the last three quarters
of 1942 and the first quarter of 1943.
In an order effective November 1, 1942, ODT turned its attention
to carload traffic.° Generally s.peaking, the order required that all
cars to be used for carload shipments should be loaded to capacity.
Several definitions of capacity were provided, suitable to different
circumstances. The order was not to be interpreted in such a way as
to require unsafe loading or inefficient "stowage practices". To give
more precision to the latter proviso, a series of specific minimum
loading requirements were prescribed for numerous specific kinds of
traffic; this list has been extended from time to time.
Even though railway operating departments are called upon to
handle more heavily loaded cars as traffic expands, they usually suc-
ceed in handling more loaded cars per train. Around May 1938 there
were 28.5 loaded car-miles per train-mile, around July 1943, 33.7.
Since cars are more heavily loaded and there are more of them per
8GeneralOrder O.D.T. No. 1,issuedMarch 23,1942; amendedApril 30 arid May 15.
General Order O.D.T. No. 18(Revised),issued October 13,1942.
(13)TABLE 6
Less than Carload Freight, by Quarters, 1938-1943
FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH
QUARTER QUARTER QUARTER QUARTER
TONS ORIGINATED (THOUSANDS)
1938 3,360 3,525 3,750 3,763
1939 3,384 3,655 3,954 3,971
1940 3,308 3,546 3,754 4,084
1941 3,786 4,612 4,924 4,768
1942 4,428 4,412 4,244 4,492
1943 4,407
CARS LOADED (THOUSANDS)
1938 1,908 1,913 1,919 1,942
1939 1,907 1,973 1,978 1,973
1940 1,866 1,917 1,931 1,966
1942 1,964 2,080 2,006 1,991
1942 1,892 1,395 1,142 1,156
1943 1,205
TONS ORIGINATED PER CAR LOADED
1938 1.76 1.84 1.95 1.94
1939 1.77 1.85 2.00 2.01
1940 1.77 1.85 1.94 2.08
1941 1.93 2.22 2.45 2.39
1942 2.34 3.16 3.72 3.89
1943 3.66
train the average trainload rises even more rapidly than the other
two ratios. At the trough there were 733 ton-miles, in the vicinity
of last July 1,116 ton-miles per train-mile. Ton-miles per car-mile
increased 29 per cent, loaded car-miles per train-mile 18 per cent, and
ton-miles per train-mile 52 per cent. A gain of 173 per cent in revenue
ton-miles was handled with an increase of only 106 per cent in loaded
car-miles and only 75 per cent in train-miles.
Chart 2 indicates that the improvement in ton-miles per car-mile
and in car-miles and ton-miles per train-mile has at times halted for
periods of several months. But the growth of traffic itself has also
been irregular. The variations in the chart may reflect either failure
of increments in traffic to produce their usual effect or absence of such
increments. The relation between increments in traffic and the per
car-mile and per train-mile ratios is approached more directly in
Charts 6, 7, and 8.
Although these ratios have improved in past expansions, no earlier
expansion affords any clue as to how they might behave when traffic
rises above 39 billion ton-miles per month (Table 1). In the present
instance, however, additional traffic has been associated with higher
loading per car in the range of variation from 39 to 68 billion ton-
[14)Ton—miles per Car-mile
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Loaded Car—miles per Train-mile
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Billions of revenue ton—milesmiles quite as clearly as in the range below 39 billions (Chart 6). Ap-
parently a limit to the number of loaded carspertrain is reached in
the vicinity of 42 billion ton-miles. Beyond that point, although two
or three of the very largest traffic volumes are associated with ex-
tremely high averages, the ratio shows no consistent tendency to rise
(Chart 7). Even before that limit the gain from additional incre-
ments of traffic seems to diminish.
Nevertheless the average trainload improves with successive in-
crements of traffic in the new higher as well as in the lower range of
variation (Chart 8).Butthe rate of improvement is slower in the
higher range. In large part this results from the failure of the number
of cars per train to grow beyond a certain point, for the average train-
load is the product of the average carload and the number of cars
per train.
CHART8
Net Ton—miles per Train—mile
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Oneach chart there are 1.7dotsfor quantities of traffic higher than
50 billion ton-miles; 16 pertain to months later than April, 1942.
Theirvertical position is therefore affected by the successively higher
t16)minimum requirements imposed by the l.c.l. order. Ten pertaIn to
months later than October and are affected b.y the 1.c.l. order. The
ODT requirements helped to maintain the improvement shown in
this part of the range on Charts 6 and 8.
During a cyclical rise in passenger traffic the average number of
travelers in a car usually rises. From the 1938 low point in travel to
the summer months of 1943, passenger-miles per car-mile'° increased
from 12.7 to 33.8,or166 per cent. Operating officials have thought
it desirable to run some extra cars, but not a proportionately greater
number.
To a considerable extent additional cars are usually handled by
lengthening trains rather than by running additional trains.In
the present case the number of passenger car-miles per train-mile
has increased 47 per cent.
Thus a growth of 366 per cent in passenger-miles. has been
handled with an increase of only 75 per cent in car-miles and only
19 per cent in train-miles (Table 7).
TABLE 7
Passenger Service Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted
Averages for trough quarter, 1938,





Passenger-miles (miii.) 1,704 7,939 366
Passenger car-miles (mill.) 134.5 235.2 75
Passenger train-miles (mill.) 32.5 38.6 19
Passenger-miles per car-mile 12.7 33.8 166
Passenger car-miles per train-mile 4.14 6.10 47
Passenger-miles per train.mile 52.5 205.8 292
Effective October 4, 1942, ODT prohibited the operation of any
regularly scheduled trains which were not scheduled during the
week ended September 24, and the running of extra sections or
special trains."
10 Car-mile figures cited in this paper pertain to coaches and sleeping and parlor cars
only. They do not include dining, lounge or baggage cars, mail or express cars.
11 General Order O.D.T. No. 24, issued September 30, 1942. The order does not apply
to military or other governmental movements; and other, minor exceptions have been
authorized by the order or amendments or general and special permits.
[17)A comparison of Charts 3 and 5 is sufficient to indicate that even
at the unprecedented level of traffic recently attained, increments in
traffic continue to bring with them increases in the number of
passengers per in the number of cars per train, and consequently
in the number of passengers per train.
Looking to the future, a further rise in passenger-miles per car-
mile and hence per train-mile is possible. On a country-wide aver-
age, equipment is still not fully utilized. The highest recorded num-
ber of Pullman passenger-miles per car-mile is 23,inAugust 1943.12
The average capacity of a sleeping car is 25passengers.13But this
figure is based on counting each berth as having a capacity of one
passenger. In military movements two soldiers usually sleep in one
lower berth;'4 civilians can sometimes arrange to do likewise. The
highest record in coach travel was reached in June, 1943—44coach
passenger-miles per car-mile.'5 The weighted average seating capacity
of coaches was about 74. In addition, standees can be carried, as they
often are. On the more congested runs, of course, Pullman reserva-
tions are sold out well in advance, and the number of passengers
per coach greatly exceeds 44. Nevertheless the averages show that
there is still much relatively empty equipment. Some of it can be
diverted to the more heavily traveled routes. Although the Pullman
averages indicate a closer approach to capacity, would-be Pullman
passengers can travel in coaches if necessary. A further increase in
passengers per car, of course, can probably be achieved, although
only at the cost of still more discomfort to travelers, inevitable under
war conditions.
FACTORS IN ECONOMY OF EQUIPMENT
Since there has been a great rise in traffic, relatively little increase in
some types of serviceable equipment, and an actual decrease in the
others, obviously the amount of traffic handled per serviceable
propulsion unit or car has greatly increased. Such an increase de-
pends in part on the amount of time equipment spends in trains
and in part on the amount of traffic handled per hour of train service.
Performance of equipment per hour in train service in turn depends
12 This includes passengers transported free by the railroads but charged for Pullman
accomodations. The passenger-mile figure used in the calculation is from the Survey of
Current Business.
13 For parlor cars the figure is 32, but most of the travel is in sleepers.
14 Office of War Information: Press release 1607, April 25, 1943, p. 4.
15 When figures for months later than July (coach travel) and August (Pullman travel)
become available, they may surpass these records.
[18)partly on passenger-miles or ton-miles per car-mile and on car-miles
per train-mile and partly on the speed of trains.
As already noted, ton-miles per car-mile have increased 29 per
cent, loaded car-miles per train-mile 18 per cent, and ton-miles per
train-mile therefore 52 per cent (Table 8). But the effect of this
improvement has been diminished by the change in train-miles per
train-hour.
TABLE 8
Freight Service Statistics, Seasonally Adjusted
Averages for trough quarter, 1938,





1Serviceable locomotives 17,060 19,594 15
2Serviceable cars (thous.) 1,714 2,000 17
3Revenue ton-miles (bill.) 22.9 62.5 173
4 Net ton-miles (bill.)b 25.0 66.1 164
5Loaded car-miles (mill.) 970 1,996 106
6 Train-miles (miii.) 34.4 60.1 75
7Train-hours (thous.) 2,076 3,824 84
8 Loaded car-hours (mill.) 5+17 58.8 127.1 116
9 Net ton-miles per loaded car-mile 4+5 25.7 33.1 29
10 Loaded car-miles per train-mile 5÷6 28.5 33.7 18
11 Net ton-miles per train-mile 4—i-6 733 1,116 52
12 Train-miles per train-hour 6÷7 16.5 15.7 —5
13 Net ton-miles per train hour 11X12 12,094 17,521 45
14 Train-hours per serviceable locomotive7+1 121.7 195.2 60
15Revenue ton-miles per serv. bc. (thous.) 3-i-i 1,342 3,191 138
16 Net ton-miles per loaded car-mile 9 25.7 33.1 29
17Car-miles per loaded car-hour 16.5 15.7 —5
18 Net ton-miles per loaded car-hour 16X17 424 519 22
19 Loaded car-hours per serviceable car 34.3 63.6 85
20 Revenue ton-miles per serviceable car3+2 13,360 31,160 133
a Applies strictly only to underlying figures for individual months. Because of rounding
of decimals and simple averaging of ratios for individual months, figures in following
columns may differ slightly from those which would be indicated by these formulae.
b Revenue ton-miles plus movement of railroad companies' own materials in freight
trains. Ratios shown below on this basis are not conveniently available on basis of rev-
enue ton-miles only.
CLine17 assumed to he same as line 12. Not strictly true but percentage change prob-
ably not seriously affected.
During a cylical expansion of freight traffic the speed of freight
trains has usually declined, remained stationary, or risen less rapidly
than during a contraction. Until the first few months of 1941 the
average speed prevailing at the beginning of the current expansion
was maintained. Since then there has been an appreciable decline in
{19]miles per hour (Chart 2).Congestionof lines, and more time spent
at way stations in picking up cars and 1.c.l. shipments or dropping
them from trains, have been making themselves felt.
Because train-miles per hour tend to decline duringexpansion,
the change in ton-miles per train-hour is not as favorable as that in
ton-miles per train-mile. Nevertheless the increase in train-load is
likely to more than offset the falling speed. In the present expansion
the net result of a 52 per cent increase in ton-miles per train-mile
and a 5 per cent decrease in train-miles per train-hour has been a 45
per cent increase in ton-miles per train-hour. This means that a
locomotive, on the average, handles 45percent more traffic during
an hour's work than at the 1938 trough.
Not only are locomotives accomplishing more during each hour
at work but they are working more hours. Train-hours per serviceable
locomotive have risen from 122 per month at the trough to 195 per
month. A 45 per cent improvement in hourly performance has been
accompanied by a 60 per cent improvement in the time a locomotive
spends with a train behind it.'6 The combined effect of the two
factors has been a 138 per cent gain in the revenue ton-miles of
movement performed per serviceable locomotive.
The serviceable life of a freight car is similarly divided into the
time it spends under load in freight trains and the time it spends
otherwise. We estimate the loaded hours in trains per serviceable
freight car as 34.3 per month at the trough and 63.6 in the recent
period, an advance of 85 per cent. Ton-miles per car-hour have risen
22 per cent.
In World War I, the number of hours freight cars could spend
in useful movement was reduced because traffic for which no ware-
house or vessel space was available arrived at the ports in great quan-
tities, and consequently cars were used merely as places of storage.
To avoid this danger in the present war, ODT requires consignors to
obtain permits, certifying that shipping or storage space will be
available, from appropriate government authorities before shipments
to the ports for export may be accepted by carriers.17
16 The absolute number of locomotive miles is somewhat greater than the number of
train-miles, chiefly because some locomotives are assigned to help others handle some
trains. But the ratio between the two figures is practically Constant.
17 The system was initiated by Instruction O.D.T. No. 1, effective June 1, 1942, and
revised in General Order O.D.T. No. 16, effective August 1, 1942 as to private freight
and July 10, 1942 in other respects. The regulations have been relaxed from time to
time in special cases. The order has been amended to prevent shipments of government
freight to commercial warehouses in port areas except on prior permit, effective January
10, 1944.ODT has also established a system of telegraphic control of
freight movement designed to avoid another danger to the mobility
of equipment. When one route is likely to become congested a central
control office instructs the railroads concerned to dispatch traffic
by other routes.
Freight cars spend part of their remaining time in trains but
moving, empty, to places where loads are available. Ordinarily the
ratio of loaded to total movement rises during an expansion of
traffic. The change results largely from the milder cyclical ampli-
.tude of petroleum and perishable traffic. Commodities of this kind are
shipped in special types of cars for which a return load often cannot
be found. The more rapid increase in freight carried in other types
of cars causes the empty movement to become relatively less im-
portant. The tendency was observable in this expansion up to Feb-
ruary, 1942 (Chart 2),18Duringthe next three months, the diversion
of oil to the railroads caused a sharp drop in the ratio of loaded
movement, from 65.2 in February to 61.0 in May. Thereafter the
growth of other traffic once more gained over that of the com-
modities requiring specialized equipment. The ratio again rose, al-
though not to its former level.
In passenger as in freight service an increase in the number of
hours equipment is used in trains, as well as the load factors pre-
viously reviewed, have contributed to the increase in traffic handled
per unit of serviceable equipment. The gain in this respect may be
illustrated by comparison of june, july and August 1938 with the
corresponding months of 1943 (Table 9) .j9Thenumber of train-
hours per serviceable motive power unit has increased 24 per cent.
Although motive power hours substantially exceed train-hours at all
times, the percentage increase in motive power hours in train service
per serviceable power unit has probably been about the same as in
train-hours per unit. Apparently more hours in service have been far
less important than better performance per hour in accounting for
the improvement in performance per serviceable unit. The same is
true of cars. During the five years, we estimate, hours in train
18Unusualefforts to find return loads for refrigerator cars have been a contributing
factor. OWl Release 1607, p. 12.
19Because the original data do not go back far enough so that seasonally adjusted fig-
ures based upon them would be of much value to us in an analysis of cycles, we have
not prepared such figures for train-hours or train-miles per train-hour in passenger
service. Hence the table is based on unadjusted data for comparable months; almost
all of the expansion of travel, however, occurred in the interval of 5yearscovered by
the table.
[21)service per serviceable car increased 71 per cent; passen4ger-miles per
hour of car movement 143 per cent. Passenger-miles. per serviceable
car increased 317 per cent.
TABLE 9
Passenger Service Statistics
Averages for three months ending
August 31, 1938 and 1943
DERIVATIONa1938 1943 CHANGE
1Serviceable locomotives & rail motor cars 8,928 8,472 —5
2Serviceable passenger carrying cars b 23,354 23,322 0
3Passenger-miles (mill.) - 1,982 8,255 316
4 Passenger carrying car-miles (mill.) 140.9 241.8 72
5Train-hours (thous.) 955 1,124 18
6 Passenger carrying car-hours (thous.)4+10 4,059 6,948 71
7Passenger-miles per passenger carrying
car-mile 3±4 14.1 34.2 143
8Passenger carrying car-miles per
train-mile 4.25 6.18 45
9Passenger—miles per train-mile 59.7 210.0 252
10Train-miles per train-hour 34.7 34.8 0
11Passenger-miles per train-hour 9X10 2,071 7,310 253
12Train-hours per serviceable locomotive
& rail motor car (thous.) 5±1 107.0 132.7 24
13Passenger-miles per serviceable loco-
motive & rail motor car (thous.)3±1 222.0 974.4 339
14 Passenger-miles per passenger carrying
car-mile 3±4 14.1 34.2 143
15Passenger carrying car-miles per
passenger carrying car-hour C 34.7 34.8 0
16 Passenger-miles per passenger carrying
car-hour 14X15 489 1,189 143
17Passenger carrying car-hours (thous.)4÷15 4,059 6,948 71
18Passenger carrying car-hours per
serviceable passenger carrying car17±2 173.8 297.9 71
19Passenger-miles per serviceable
passenger carrying car (thous.) 3÷2 84.9 354.0 317
aSeeTable 8, note a.
b Estimate. Actual averages of serviceable railway-owned passenger train cars reduced by
ratio of all railway-owned passenger carrying cars to all railway-owned passenger train
cars on December 31, 1937 and 1941 (1942 not available). Resulting figures raised by
ratio of all railroad and Pullman owned passenger carrying cars to railroad owned pas-
senger cars on same dates.
CAssumedto be same as (10).
MANPOWER
The operation of a train for one hour requires the performance of
several manhours of work by a train crew. The number of manhours
worked by train and engine employees per hour of train operation
is fairly constant. It is not much affected by cyclical variations in
t22)total ton-miles performed. Thus prom June, July and August
to the corresponding months of 1943,althoughnet ton-miles per
train-hour increased 42 per cent, manhours worked by freight train
and engine employees per train-hour increased only 10 per cent.
Passenger train and engine employees worked only 15 per cent more
hours per train-hour in the 1943 period than in the 1938 period.
Passenger-miles per train-hour increased 253percent between the
same dates.
The customary statistical grouping of train and engine service
employees includes not only workers on freight and passenger
trains but also those who work on switching locomotives or ride
cars in yards. Even so, the group currently includes only about 22
per cent of all railroad workers. Both in the train and engine
group (VI b) as a whole and in each of the other major statistical
groups, the increase in employment and in time paid for has been
much less than in traffic (Table 10)
20In the other groups, percentage changes in time paid for do not differ greatly from
those in time worked. In Group VI b, however, because pay for a minimum amount of
work per day worked and sometimes per month is guaranteed, a much larger difference
is possible. As business improves, the railroad companies are able to use more of the
time they must pay for anyway. Thus time actually worked by Group VI b employees
has increased 83 per cent rather than 76 per cent between the periods shown in Table 10.
TABLE 10
Number of Employees, and Time Paid for
Major Statistical Groups of Employees
Percentage change from three months ending August 31, 1938
to same period of, 1943
WORKERS FOR WORKERS FOR
WHOM DAYS WHOM HOURS
WORKED ARE WORKED ARE
REPORTED REPORTED
i.c.c. Days Flours
GROUP Number paid.for Number paid for
IExecutives, etc. 18 19
IiProfessional, clerical & general 11 13 46 54
IIIMaintenance of way & structures 22 22 49 76
IVMaintenance of equipment & stores 25 29 67 101
V Station employees, etc. —8 —5 41 52
Via Yard employees 72 70 35 54
Vib Train & engine employees 52 76
The number of employees for whom the number of days, rather
than hours worked is reported, and the time worked by them, usually
increases less than the number and time for hourly workers. Most
[23)daily workers hold either supervisory posts or jobs, such as crossing
watchmen, which are little affected by the volume of traffic. Except
in the relatively small group of yard workers, the number of hourly
workers has increased more than the number of day workers, and the
number of hours paid for more than the number of days paid for.
Among hourly workers, the greatest increases in number em-
ployed and time worked have been in the train and engine and the
two maintenance groups. For such workers as clerks, station em-
ployees, switchmen, the increases have been considerably smaller.
In previous cycles output of transportation per man-hour worked
by all railway employees has tended to rise in expansion and fall in
contraction. Obviously there has been a net rise in productivity during
the current expansion. When the new experience with volumes of
freight traffic in excess of 39 billion ton-miles per month is con-
sidered separately, the same general relationship between produc-
tivity and volume is found (Chart 9). Increases in ton-miles per
manhour worked by all railway employees reported on an hourly
basis are still associated with increases in total ton-miles. This im-
provement occurred even though the rise in freight traffic was
accompanied by a sharp rise in travel.2'
21Similarratios of• ton-miles to manhours, based upon hours worked by all employees
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[24)In the railroad industry, as in others, lengthening the work week
one possible means of adding to the supply of manpower. How in-
tensively is the industry already utilizing its workers? The best
calculation that can be made suggests that a week of more than 48
hours has been reached. During the 12 months ending August 31,
1943,hoursworked per employee per weekday ranged from a low
point of 8.18 in September to a high point of 8.81inAugust
(Table 11).
TABLE 11
Hours Worked per Employee per Weekday
September 1942-August 1943
ALL TRAIN & ENGINE ALL OTHER
1942 EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES
September 8.18 8.36 8.12
October 8.39 8.46 8.37
November 8.45 8.64 8.38
December 8.22 8.44 8.16
1943
January 8.45 8.68 8.38
February 8.54 8.72 8.48
March 8.54 8.52 8.55
April 8.46 8.25 8.52
May 8.51 8.38 8.60
June 8.49 8.15 8.59
July 8.31 8.25 8.33
August 8.81 8.73 8.83
Total manhours worked per month divided by number of employees at middle of month.
Resulting figure divided by number of weekdays in month. Total manhours computed
as follows: straight time actually worked plus overtime paid for plus (in train and
engine service) constructive allowances.
In train and engine service, the distance traveled by some trains
and their speed limit the actual working time of the crew to three or
four hours per day or less. It might be suspected that, in spite of the
high average for all workers in the industry, a substantial reserve
of unused hours exists in this branch of employment. But if short
daily assignments are still numerous, there must be many others that
consume a good deal more than 8hours,for here too the average
time actually worked per day has been running well above that
figure, ranging from 8.15 in June to 8.73 in August. In half of the
including those for whom only days worked are reported, would, if available,be lower
thanthose shown in the chart. But the omitted workers are only a small percentage of
the total, and the ratios would be distributed with reference to total ton-miles in much
the same way as those actually shown.
[25)twelve months the average day in thjs servke was longer than that
of other railway workers.
The shorter working assignments are most common on passenger.
trains, next most common on through freights. Details b.y occupations
and classes of service for August, 1943(Table12) may be illum-
inating. In passenger service, time actually worked per man per day
ranged from 6.79 hours for firemen and helpers to 7.85forbrake-
men and flagmen. In through freight service, firemen averaged 7.75
hours per day, conductors 9.18; the two other occupations were in
between. Apparently it would be easy to exaggerate the amount by
which the average working day could be lengthened even in these
services. In local freight service the day is quite long: from 11.03
hours for brakemen to 11.74 for conductors. In yard operation fire-
men and helpers worked 8.30 hours, conductors and yard foremen
9.47 hours.
TABLE 12
Hours Worked per Employee per Weekday,a August 1943
Train and Engine Workers, by Service
PASSENGER FREIGHT SERVICE YARD
SERVICE Through Local SERVICE
Engineers & motormen 7.00 8.52 11.67 9.06
Firemen & helpers 6.79 7.75 11.11 8.30
Conductorsb 7.84 9.18 11.74 9.47
Assistant conductorsc 7.82
Baggagemen 7.70
Brakemen & flagmend 7.85 8.18 11.03 8.43
aForderivation, see Table 11, note. CIncludesticket collectors.
b In yard service includes yard foremen.d In yard service, brakemen and yard helpers.
PROFITS
Expansions of traffic and the related improvement in unit per-
formance are usually accompanied b.y an increase of operating
profits. Net earnings usually grow faster than revenues; the per-
centage of gross carried through to net rises. Recent events provide
a forceful illustration.
Although operating revenues in the summer of 1943 were 169
per cent higher than at the trough in 1938, operating expenses—that
is, charges for such items as labor, materials, and depreciation—
were oniy 107 per cent higher. Net revenue from railway opera-
tions—the amount remaining from revenues after deducting oper-
ating expenses—was 388 per cent greater (Table 13).
Taxes accrued by railroads have risen very sharply—531 per
[26)TABLE 13
Operatcng Income Account, Seasonally Adjusted
Averages for trough quarter, 1938





Total operating revenues 282.9 761.7 169
Total operating expenses 220.5 457.4 107
Net revenue from railway operations 62.4 304.4 388
Railway tax accruals 27.7 174.8 531
Railway operating income 34.7 129.6 273
Equipment & joint facility rents 10.8 16.6 54
Net railway operating income 23.9 113.0 373
*Month of trough in total operating revenues.
cent—largely because of greater net corporate income and of higher
corporate income and excess profits tax rates. Adjusted monthly
data on taxes by classes are not available but annual data demon-
strate the importance of income and profit taxes sufficiently. Payroll
taxes amounted to $99,200,000 in 1938 and $171,000,000 in 1942.
Miscellaneous taxes, chiefly property taxes imposed by State and
local governments, were $222,700,000 in 1938. Their amount in
1942 is not yet known, but they do not change rapidly; probably they
did not come to much over $240,000,000. Consequently about
$791,000,000 of the $1,202,000,000 tax total in 1942 was income
and excess profits tax accruals. In 1938 taxes of this type were only
$18,900,000.
Since taxes rose more than net revenue, net operating income
(net revenue minus taxes) increased less than net revenue before
taxes.
The figure for equipment and joint facility rents pertains to Class
I roadsone system.; in its computation, payments by one such
road to another cancel. Its magnitude therefore depends on pay-
ments by Class I roads to others, which are composed principally
of payments for the use of privately owned freight cars. These cars
are used mainly to haul petroleum products or perishable foodstuffs
—traffic that has mild cyclical variations. The rates of compensa-
tion also show considerable inflexibility'. Consequently total
equipment and facility rent has only mild cyclical fluctuations. In
this expansion it has risen only 54 per cent. If the great diversion
27)of petroleum traffic from coastwise movement had not occurred, the
rise would have been even milder. Net railway operating income (net
operating income minus equipment and facility rentals) rose by a
greater percentage than any of the other income account figures so
far reviewed except taxes and net revenue before taxes.
VOLUME AND PROFITS IN TWO WARS
The increase in operating profits has been greater and more sus-
tained in the present expansion than in that associated with World
World I. During the first two and one-half years of the current
phase, the growth of net revenue differed little from its. course in
the earlier phase. But from then on net revenue in the first war de-
clined sharply, and failed to recover its previous level until the
expansion came to an end. In the present phase an almost exactly
opposite movement can be observed. The current expansion has
lasted much longer than the earlier one, and profits have advanced
to new high levels (Chart 10).Astudy of the course of railway
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Onereason for the difference is the different relationship between
freight rates and prices of railway materials. We have found no
index of prices paid by railroads in the earlier period. Instead we
have struck unweigh ted averages of three Bureau of Labor Statistics
wholesale price indexes: building materials, metals and metal prod-
ucts, and fuel and lighting, with the averages for the three months
November, 1914 to January, 1915 taken as 100.Thecombined index
22 The concept of net railway operating income was not introduced into the accounts
until 1917;consequentlyno comparison in terms of this third definition of operating
profits can be drawn.
[29)CHART 12
Passenger—miles, Seasonally Adjusted
Months from trough in passenger—m[les
rises to 189 in April,
1918 (the peak in passenger-miles).
materials, fuels, and supplies prepared by theBureau of Railway
Economics indicates a rise of only about 14 per cent from the approxi-
mate 1938 average to December,1942.23
23 Railwaywage rates, on the other hand, were stable during the earlier expansion and
rose somewhat during the second. Wage adjustments were largely deferred until June
1918, one month after the peak in freight traffic and two months after the peak in
travel. In that month sharp increases were made, retroactive to January 1.Theretroactive
increases were largely if not entirely charged to operating expenses for June, and ac-
count for the sharp fall in net operating revenue to less than zero in that month. In the
cufrent expansion wage increases averaging about 15 per cent were made in Diecember
[30)
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1918 (the peak in ton-miles) and 191 in May,
An index of prices of railwayNeither rates nor fares were advanced much during either ex-
pansion. Freight rates and passenger fares in the earlier period were
not raised substantially until June 26, 1918, after the expansion had
ended. Freight rates were increased somewhat less than 5 per cent
and passenger fares somewhat less than 10 per cent early in 1942;
in 1943 most of these increases were rescinded. In the earlier expan-
sion, obviously, higher prices paid for railway materials and supplies
were not compensated for by higher prices received for railway
services.
Another factor in the diffeEence, as to profits, between the later
stages of the two expansions is the difference in the development of
traffic. During the first 31 months of the current expansion the
growth in freight traffic was about as great as during the same
period of the 19 14-18 expansion. The two curves start from about
the same level, and interlace (Chart 11). But thereafter they di-
verge, and the curve for the present expansion rises sharply above
that for 19 14-18. The current expansion in passenger traffic started
at a considerably lower level than the 1914-18 expansion in travel
and remained well below for the first 37 months. Then the new
curve began to climb rapidly toward the old and is. now well above
it(Chart 12)Therelative movement of the two curves for
profits resembles the relative movement of the two curves for freight
traffic. After the first 30 months of the earlier expansion) both ton-
miles and net revenue fell off sharply, then barely recovered their
former level. In the current period both rose sharply after the
thirtieth month, although both subsequently declined temporarily.
The comparison cannot be extended beyond 40 months, for the
earlier expansion lasted only 40 months; the later one showed no
conclusive sign in its 63rd month (August, 1943) of having come
to an end.
1941. (In modilied form they were retroactive to September, but in part they were anti-
cipated in preparing the income accounts for those months.) Further increases have
recently beeen made.
24Somereaders may be interested in comparisons starting from the outbreak of hostil-
ities (August 1914andSeptember 1939)orfrom America's entry in 1917onthe one
hand and the beginning of the defense effort in 1940orour entry in 1941onthe other.
For their convenience the appropriate dates are shown in the charts.
[31 }
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